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FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS AS A 
RULE OF LAW 
MICHAEL C. BLUMM* 
Reserved water rights—in which the federal government retains suffi-
cient water to carry out the purposes of federal land reservations1—have 
never been popular among the Western water diversion lobby, some of whom 
view these federal water rights with alarm and steadfast opposition. Alt-
hough first articulated by the Supreme Court over a century ago,2 federal 
water rights are seen throughout the West as a threat to established rights 
holders because their early priority dates could defease what they assumed 
were vested property rights.3 If there are actually any diverters who’ve been 
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also to Sam Shurts, 2L, Lewis and Clark Law School, for research assistance. Dedicated to the 
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 1. See generally 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS ch. 37 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3rd ed. 
2014) (comprehensive analysis of federal reserved water rights). 
 2. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908) (“The power of the Govern-
ment to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not 
denied, and could not be. . . . That the Government did reserve them we have decided and for 
a use which would be necessarily continued through the years.”). Thus, reserved rights are so-
named because they reserve water from state systems of allocation. 
 3. Western water law is a system of state-granted usufructuary rights that allocated 
rights to water diverters based largely on the mining-camp rule of temporal priority (thus, the 
name “prior appropriation law”), or “first in time, first in right” to put water to a “beneficial 
use.” Beneficial use, an anti-waste concept, was also the measure of a water right. Failure to 
use resulted in forfeiture of the right, since the system was premised on putting property rights 
in water into as many hands as possible and out of the hands of speculators. Another antimo-
nopolization concept concerned the fact that rights-holders did not have to own land as under 
the riparian rights system governing Eastern water. See generally DAVID SCHORR, THE 
COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ON THE 
AMERICAN FRONTIER (2012). Although founded on antimonopolization principles, the aliena-
bility of Western water rights encouraged transfers that led to domination by large landown-
ers, mostly irrigators. See, e.g., DONALD W. WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND 
THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1985). 
The beneficial use concept could have been (and still might be) used to update prior 
appropriation law in the twenty-first century, but in the hands of state water agencies cap-
tured by the water diversion lobby, it has not. See Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, 
and Forfeiture: the Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 
958–59 (1998). Absent a modern version of beneficial use, Western law has become extremely 
rigid and hierarchical, far from the intentions of its founders, now controlled by the few at the 
expense of the many. The system is unlikely ever to change, given the inheritability of water 
rights as well as the ability to sell to the highest bidder.   
Modernization of Eastern water has come by converted common law riparian rights into 
rights granted for a term. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, at § 9.03(a)(4) (not-
ing a variety of approaches to the length of the term for so-called regulated riparian rights, 
from 20 to 50 years). Although a state’s attempt to convert Western prior appropriation rights 
into term rights would likely be resisted as an unconstitutional taking without just compensa-
tion, if the state were California—where there are no vested water rights under the Mono Lake 
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defeased by federal reserved rights, however, they’ve been few and far be-
tween.4 
Once thought to be expansive in their scope, the U.S. Supreme Court 
confined reserved waters on the largest federal land system with reserved 
rights—the national forest system—to timber production and watershed pro-
tection nearly four decades ago.5 Moreover, many federal rights have been 
integrated into state water systems as a result of water right settlements, 
most notably in Montana.6 But reserved rights still generate hostility and 
                                                       
doctrine, Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal. 1983)—the takings claim 
would fail. Outside of California, conversions could be upheld by analogy to the law of amorti-
zation of non-conforming land uses. See 1 JULIUS L. SACKMAN ET AL., NICHOLS ON EMINENT 
DOMAIN § 1.42[10] (3rd ed. 2015) (discussing various amortization provisions in the context of 
zoning law). Moreover, in Idaho, it is hardly clear that a takings claim for a water right could 
succeed given the clear legislative pronouncement of the public nature of all the water in the 
state: 
 
All the waters of the state, when flowing in their natural channels, in-
cluding the waters of all natural springs and lakes within the boundaries 
of the state are declared to be the property of the state, whose duty it shall 
be to supervise their appropriation and allotment to those diverting the 
same therefrom for any beneficial purpose, and the right to the use of any 
of the waters of the state for useful or beneficial purposes is recognized 
and confirmed; and the right to the use of any of the public waters which 
have heretofore been or may hereafter be allotted or beneficially applied, 
shall not be considered as being a property right in itself, but such right 
shall become the complement of, or one of the appurtenances of, the land 
or other thing to which, through necessity, said water is being applied . . 
. . 
 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-101 (West 2015). 
 4. Dean Trelease found few, if any, practical effects of reserved rights on state 
rights-holders. FRANK J. TRELEASE, NAT’L WATER COMM’N, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN 
WATER LAW 758, 769 (1971); Frank J. Trelease, Federal Reserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 
54 DENV. L.J. 473, 491–92 (1977) (“[N]ot a single case of harm has been reported . . . for all of 
the outcry . . . not one state, not one county, not one municipality, not one irrigation district, 
not one corporation, not one individual has come forward to plead and prove that the United 
States…has destroyed any private right.”). 
 5. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 707 (1978) (denying reserved water 
rights for fish and wildlife, recreation, and aesthetic purposes on national forest lands); see 
also Sally K. Fairfax & A. Dan Tarlock, No Water for the Woods: A Critical Analysis of United 
States v. New Mexico, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 509, 509–54 (1979) (criticizing the Court’s decision). 
 6. Established in 1979, the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission 
acts as a mediator between Montana, its people, and tribes and federal agencies claiming re-
served water rights within the state. The Commission negotiates settlements on behalf of the 
state, which are then ratified by the Montana legislature, the tribes, and federal authorities. 
Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission, MONTANA.GOV, http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/re-
served-water-rights-compact-commission (last visited Nov. 29, 2015). Barbara Cosens has 
written extensively on the Montana water rights settlements in the following articles: Water 
Dispute Resolution in the West: Process Elements for the Modern Era in Basin-wide Problem 
Solving, 33 ENVTL. L. 949 (2003); A New Approach in Water Management or Business as 
Usual? The Milk River, Montana, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1 (2003); The 1997 Water Rights 
Settlement Between the State of Montana and the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy’s Res-
ervation: The Role of Community and of the Trustee, 16 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y. 255 (1997–
1998); Negotiation of the Montana—National Park Service Compact, 5 RIVERS 35 (1995) (pub-
lished with co-authors D. Amman and J. Specking).  
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litigation. A prominent example is the series of cases growing out of the Snake 
River Basin Adjudication (SRBA), Idaho’s massive McCarran Act adjudica-
tion that consumed three decades and countless billable hours for water law-
yers.7 
Two veterans of that litigation, Jeff Fereday and Chris Meyer,8 seek to 
continue an unsuccessful argument they made in the SRBA wilderness case9 
in the pages of this journal.10 They claim that the implied reserved water 
rights doctrine—under which federal water rights have been created by land 
reservations since 1908 if necessary to carry out the purposes of the reserva-
tion—no longer exists.11 The doctrine disappeared, according to Fereday and 
Meyer, in 1955 when the Supreme Court first hinted in the Pelton Dam deci-
sion that the reserved rights doctrine might not be limited to Indian reserva-
tions.12 This judicial hint, they maintain, had the effect of imposing on Con-
gress the duty to expressly claim or disclaim federal water rights in post-1955 
land reservations.13 After that date, their argument goes, Congress could no 
longer assume that the judicially created doctrine of federal water rights 
would persist, and therefore had to expressly reserve water rights in land 
management statutes.14 In effect, their claim is that legislative history re-
vealing congressional debate over the reserved rights issue categorically 
ended the implied reserved water rights doctrine.15 
                                                       
 7. The SRBA was a 27-year legal effort to resolve numerous disputes and determine 
water rights in the Snake River Basin. The adjudication began in 1987, developing out of the 
Swan Falls Agreement between the State and Idaho Power Co., and its “Final Unified Decree” 
was signed on August 25, 2014. See generally 42 IDAHO L. REV. No. 3 (2006); Symposium on 
the Settlement of Indian Reserved Water Rights Claims (2005). Some of the important case 
law that the SRBA generated include: United States v. State, 959 P.2d 449, 131 Idaho 468 
(1998) (the Pickett and Stock-Raising Homestead Acts included express congressional intent 
to reserve federal water rights); United States v. Challis, 988 P.2d 1199, 133 Idaho 525 (1999) 
(the federal Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act created no federal reserved water rights); Pot-
latch Corp. v. United States (Potlatch II), 12 P.3d 1260, 134 Idaho 916 (2000) (no reserved 
federal water rights for wilderness areas; limited water rights for the Hells Canyon National 
Recreation Area as well as under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act); Idaho v. United States 
(Sawtooth), 12 P.3d 1284, 134 Idaho 940 (2000) (no federal water rights for the Sawtooth Na-
tional Recreation Act); United States v. State (Deer Flat), 23 P.3d 117, 135 Idaho 655 (2001) 
(no federal water rights for the Deer Flat National Wildlife Refuge). 
 8. Fereday and Meyer represented Potlatch Corp., various irrigation districts, canal 
and mining companies, and the cities of Salmon and Challis, Idaho.  
 9. Potlatch II, 12 P.3d at 1283–84, 134 Idaho at 939–40 (in which their clients pre-
vailed, although not on the theory they propound in their journal article). 
 10. Jeffrey C. Fereday & Christopher H. Meyer, What is the Federal Reserved Water 
Rights Doctrine, Really? Answering This Question in Idaho’s Snake River Basin Adjudication, 
52 IDAHO L. REV. 341 (2016).  
 11. Id. at 343. 
 12. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Oregon (Pelton Dam), 349 U.S. 435, 443–45 (1955) (“[T]he 
project is to occupy land which come within the term ‘reservations’ as distinguished from ‘pub-
lic lands’. . . . Since the Indian Treaty of 1855, the lands . . . have been reserved for the use of 
the Indians.  More recently, they were reserved for power purposes . . . .”). 
 13. Fereday & Meyer, supra note 10, at 343–44. 
 14. Id. at 344. 
 15. Id. 
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The Fereday/Meyer thesis was adopted by one, and perhaps both, of the 
concurrences in the SRBA’s wilderness water decision—a fractured and 
bloody 3-2 decision,16 reversing a 3-2 decision the year before.17 Although 
their clients prevailed when the Idaho Supreme Court eliminated the biggest 
reserved rights threats to irrigation and municipal diverters in the state, the 
authors now seek to bag bigger game, in the hope of exporting their flawed 
theory elsewhere.18 
This responsive essay suggests that the Fereday/Meyer thesis has some 
serious holes in it. But they are fortunate to be able to argue before exceed-
ingly friendly state courts, whose judges must run for reelection.19 The pres-
sure their clients with diversionary water rights can bring to bear in a state 
like Idaho was of course evident in the judicial sacking of the author of the 
original SRBA wilderness water rights which recognized the federal rights.20 
Justice Cathy Silak was electorally ousted by the organized opposition of the 
irrigation community and perhaps the Republican Party.21 
                                                       
 16. For the majority’s reasoning, see infra notes 45–49 and accompanying text.  
 17. Before the case was reheard, Fereday and Meyer’s clients lost 3-2. Potlatch Corp. 
v. United States (Potlatch I), No. 24546, 1999 WL 778325, at *2 (Idaho Oct. 1, 1999), super-
seded on reh'g sub nom. by Potlatch II, 12 P.3d 1260, 134 Idaho 916 (2000). After they success-
ful petitioned for rehearing, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed itself, again by a 3-2 split, 
because Chief Justice Linda Copple Trout switched sides after Justice Cathy Silak, who wrote 
the majority opinion in Potlatch I (and the dissenting opinion in Potlatch II), was subjected to 
an intense political backlash. Silak ultimately lost her seat on the court to Daniel Eismann, 
whose campaign was openly critical of Potlatch I. 
The court’s reversal was widely criticized as the product of interest group politics and 
difficult to separate from the charged political atmosphere surrounding the ousting of Justice 
Silak. See Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., State Water Politics Versus an Independent Judiciary: The 
Colorado and Idaho Experiences, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 122 (2001); Michael C. Blumm, 
Reversing the Winters Doctrine?: Denying Reserved Water Rights For Idaho Wilderness and Its 
Implications, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 173 (2002) [hereinafter Reversing Winters]; Justin Huber & 
Sandra Zellmer, The Shallows Where Federal Reserved Water Rights Founder: State Court 
Derogation of the Winters Doctrine, 16 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 261 (2013). See also infra note 
19 and accompanying text. 
 18. Fereday & Meyer, supra note 10, at 351–52. 
 19. See Huber & Zellmer, supra note 17, at 267, 278, 284. 
 20. See id. at 284–85. 
 21. See Hobbs, supra note 17, at 140–42. Justice Silak’s opponent, current Justice 
Daniel Eismann, announced that he opposed abortion rights and evolution as part of his cam-
paign, and he benefited from what appeared to be an illegal push-poll late in the election that 
he declared he had no part in arranging. See Brennan Center for Justice, Idaho Judicial Elec-
tions 1–3 (Dec. 12, 2002) (noting that the 2000 election between Justice Silak and Eismann 
broke the record as the most expensive in Idaho judicial election history). On the Republican 
Party’s involvement, see John D. Echeverria, Changing the Rules by Changing the Players: The 
Environmental Issue in State Judicial Elections, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 217, 243–52 (2001) (not-
ing that Eismann received major financial support from the party, spoke at a party fund-raiser, 
and generated an election complaint from former Idaho Supreme Court justice Robert Hunt-
ley, which alleged that Eismann violated a state constitutional prohibition against judicial 
candidates being endorsed by a political party). 
The abrasive 2000 campaign spilled over into Chief Justice Trout’s reelection campaign 
the following year, despite her changed vote in the wilderness water case. Although she did 
win reelection, a similarly fractious campaign led her to resign before her six-year term ended. 
See infra note 58. Thus, both campaigns continue to affect the makeup of the Idaho Supreme 
Court over a decade later. 
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Given such favorable fora, it is possible that Fereday and Meyer may 
succeed. The costs of their success will be imposed on fish and wildlife whose 
habitat lies on federal lands, on recreationalists, and on those who think 
Western streams shouldn’t dry up every summer. Public Choice political the-
ory predicts that the better organized water diverters will eventually prevail 
over federal instream claims.22 Fereday and Meyer aim to ensure that the 
proponents of federal water rights lose their principal legal defense against 
state diverters: the implied reserved water rights doctrine. 
This brief response explains the great success that Fereday and Meyer 
and other challengers to federal reserved water rights have achieved in Idaho 
courts, results that may be a harbinger of the fate of implied reserved water 
rights elsewhere, then examines their argument for the complete evisceration 
of the implied reserved rights doctrine. This essay maintains that the 
Fereday/Meyer thesis should not be adopted by state courts because legisla-
tive history reflecting congressional knowledge of or debate over an issue can-
not overturn a long-established Supreme Court doctrine without some spe-
cific action by Congress. Legislative history revealing congressional debate 
and inaction is simply not a substitute for an express statement by Congress, 
which has repeatedly shown it knows how to disclaim reserved water rights 
when it wishes to do so.23 First, however, the Fereday and Meyer’s article 
warrants criticism for its failure to grasp the concept of reserved property 
rights in natural resources like water. 
I. 
The concept of reserved rights grows out of the basic property law prin-
ciple of reserving pre-existing rights. Thus, when the federal government re-
serves land for a particular purpose of what was once the vast public domain, 
it is not creating new rights but maintaining old ones.24 New land rights were 
available for private acquisition from the federal government—and some-
times from the states and railroads.25 In the case of water, Congress and the 
federal government allowed the states to determine private rights in water 
for lands that were privatized. But that didn’t mean that the federal govern-
ment renounced water rights for its retained lands, as the Supreme Court 
                                                       
 22. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public 
Lands: Why Multiple Use Failed, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L REV. 405 (1994).  
 23. See infra notes 81–83.  
 24. My thinking in this section benefited from comments from my casebook coauthor, 
Eric Freyfogle. See generally ERIC T. FREYFOGLE ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: PRIVATE 
RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (West 2015). 
 25. GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL 
RESOURCES LAW §§ 13:19–13:23 (2d ed. 2015) (discussing land grants and sales to private en-
tities). 
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made clear in the 19th century.26 Lands owned by the federal government in-
cluded all appurtenant natural resources like forests, oil and gas, and water 
until they were privatized. 
Beginning in the late 19th century and continuing to this day, Congress 
and the Executive began to “reserve” lands for particular purposes, meaning 
they would no longer be subject to the otherwise applicable disposition laws. 
Such land reservations did not actually create new water rights, any more 
than a landowner reserving a profit a prendre in land she is donating to an-
other party is creating a new right.27 She is instead reserving a pre-existing 
right. Reservations are commonplace in private land transactions. A reserved 
right is a declaration that the landowner intends to hold pre-existing rights. 
In the case of reserved water rights, the federal landowner is simply halting 
the disposition of resources it already owns. Thus, a federal reservation right 
is merely declaratory of pre-existing rights, not a new property right created 
at the time of the land reservation.28 
In the case of reserved water rights, which courts have upheld reserva-
tion date priority rights as an accommodation to state systems of water allo-
cation and to the deference to state laws consistently expressed in a number 
of federal statutes,29 Congress certainly can and has made its specific intent 
known in numerous directives, many cited by Fereday and Meyer.30 But it 
need not do so to reserve a pre-existing right. The rule of reserved rights law 
is that water is part of the land, no less appurtenant than trees or minerals. 
The fact that states have adopted contrary water rights systems does not 
mean that states may change federal property law, even if the federal gov-
ernment seeks to accommodate state law whenever possible. 
                                                       
 26. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Dist., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899) 
(observing that the states’ power to create water rights was subject to two limitations: 1) they 
cannot “destroy the right of the United States as [a landowner] to the continued flow of the 
waters; so far at least as may be necessary for thee beneficial uses of the government property, 
and 2) impede the navigable capacity of streams). 
 27. A profit a prendre, which the Restatement has now shortened to “profit,” is the 
right to take and remove a natural resource in land owned by another. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP. (SERVITUDES) § 1.2 (2000). 
 28. The fact that federal reserved rights have reservation priority dates is due to the 
federal courts’ efforts to accommodate state water allocation systems by incorporating federal 
rights into the states’ temporal priority schemes. Accommodating state systems of water allo-
cation is a consistent congressional policy, evidenced by the 1952 McCarran Amendment, 43 
U.S.C. § 666 (waiving federal sovereign immunity to allow federal water rights to be deter-
mined in state comprehensive water adjudications) and in section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation 
Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383. See generally Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: Na-
tional Interests vs. State Authority under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 
241, 268–85 (2006) (emphasizing, however, that congressional deference to state water law is 
not invariable). 
 29. See, e.g., statutes supra note 28; infra note 30; see also section 101(g) of the Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (deferring to state water allocation systems) and section 
101(c)(2) of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (calling for federal and state 
cooperation in the conservation of listed species). See Benson, supra note 28, at 298–311.  
 30. See Fereday & Meyer, supra note 10, at 351–52; see also John D. Leshy, Water 
Rights for New Federal Land Conservation Programs: A Turn of the Century Evaluation, 4 U. 
DENV. WATER L. REV. 1001, 1016–19 (2001) (citing statutes). 
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It is not inaccurate to think of the federal reserved water right as based 
on intent,31 since when Congress enacts a statute, the issue of intent is fore-
most. Congress can expressly establish or renounce reservation water rights 
and has often done so.32 Fereday and Meyer seem confident that it will con-
tinue to do so.33 If they are right, future reservations are likely to expressly 
reserve or disclaim water rights. If Congress consistently does so, federal re-
served water rights will indeed become a function of express congressional 
intent. 
As for existing reservations without express legislative intent, however, 
they possess federal water rights,34 just as a private land sale implicitly in-
cludes fixtures absent an express provision to the contrary.35 State law may 
refuse to recognize federal rights, refuse to quantify them, refuse to enforce 
them. But it may not overturn them,36 as the Idaho Supreme Court has re-
peatedly done37—in what will be long regarded as a consequence of tainted 
judicial electoral politics.38 That court’s judicial integrity would have better 
preserved had it affirmed the SRBA court on the existence of federal rights 
but remanded the issue of the amount of water “necessary” to fulfill wilder-
ness purposes. No doubt the issue would have settled, as many other water 
disputes have,39 and likely in the state’s favor, perhaps with the federal gov-
ernment subordinating its rights to existing rights and maybe some future 
ones.40 Even if such a result led to capping water diversions in cities like 
Salmon and Challis, that would not have necessarily been a bad thing, as it 
no doubt would have produced viable water markets, which might have been 
                                                       
 31. However, the Winters doctrine is part of a long tradition of judicial implication of 
federal rules to protect federal property against non-recognition by state laws. See, e.g., United 
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) (refusing to allow Louisiana to 
single out minerals reserved under lands purchased by the federal government for a wildlife 
refuge for special “anti-lapse” treatment); United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 
1974) (rejecting an attempt by North Dakota to frustrate federal acquisition of waterfowl areas 
by refusing to recognize waterfowl easements), discussed in GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET 
AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 178–87 (7th ed. 2014) (further arguing that 
these principles support a federal reserved water right for the Great Sand Dunes National 
Monument, established in 2000, 16 U.S.C. § 410hhh-7). 
 32. See infra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 31, 
at 514–16 (citing statutes expressly reserving and renouncing reserved rights). 
 33. Fereday & Meyer, supra note 10, at 344, 351. 
 34. United States v. Winters, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908). 
 35. See RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 
57.05 (2000) (defining and discussing fixtures). 
 36. See Benson, supra note 28, at 260–61, 268–74, 278–80 (explaining that state law 
cannot change federal property law, even if the federal government often defers to state water 
law). Under a basic public land law rule of construction, federal land grants are construed 
favorably to the government, with doubts resolved in its favor. See United States v. Union 
Pacific R.R., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957); see also John D. Leshy, A Property Clause for the 21st 
Century, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1101, 1106–15 (2004). 
 37. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
 38. See supra notes 17, 21; see infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 39. See WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 37.04(c) (discussing both Indian 
and non-Indian water settlements). 
 40. See infra note 55. 
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models in the coming era of climate change. Instead, the Idaho court used 
tortured logic to reach a result that the water diversion lobby sought, which 
might not prove to be in the best long-term interests of the state. Fereday and 
Meyer seek to export the promise of the Idaho result—if not the theory—to 
other Western states. This would be a bad idea for a number of reasons, as 
explained below. 
II. 
The SRBA results have been fairly catastrophic to federal reserved wa-
ter rights in Idaho. The Idaho Supreme Court declared that wilderness areas 
in the state have no reserved rights because, unlike reserved rights for Indian 
reservations, wilderness reserved rights did not benefit from favorable rules 
of statutory construction which allowed the U.S. Supreme Court to imply wa-
ter rights in the lodestar case of Winters v. United States.41 Reversing the 
SRBA court, the Idaho Supreme Court buttressed its rejection of reserved 
water for wilderness with some legal legerdemain about the 1963 U.S. Su-
preme Court’s decision in Arizona v. California, which recognized non-Indian 
reserved rights;42 a misinterpretation of the Court’s 1976 decision in Cappaert 
v. United States--which applied reserved rights against off-reservation 
groundwater pumping43--a complete disregarding of specific language con-
cerning watershed preservation, fish and wildlife, and resident and anadro-
mous fish protection in the statutes creating the individual wilderness areas 
                                                       
 41. Potlatch II, 12 P.3d 1260, 134 Idaho 916 (2000). The Winters case, 207 U.S. 564 
(1908), adopted the reasoning of the Court three years earlier in litigation over tribal access to 
fishing sites on the Columbia River. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). See WATERS 
AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, §§ 37.01(b)(2), 37.02(a)(1). 
 42. In Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601–02 (1963), the Court ruled that na-
tional forests, national wildlife refuges, and national recreation areas had reserved rights to 
Colorado River water. The Idaho Supreme Court discounted the Colorado River decision be-
cause the Wilderness Act lacked a so-called “standard of quantification.” Potlatch II, 12 P.3d 
at 1266, 134 Idaho at 922. The court never explained why the reservations in the Colorado 
River case had a quantification standard but those in the SRBA cases did not, nor that quan-
tification issues are a separate issue from the existence of a reserved right. In fact, the “quan-
tification standard” lies in the purpose of the statute orexecutive document establishing the 
reservation, and the amount of water reserved is that which is “necessary” to effectuate those 
purposes.  
 43. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (upholding the application of re-
served water rights against off-reservation groundwater pumping to protect the fish purposes 
of Devils Hole National Monument in Nevada). 
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at issue;44 and extremely narrow interpretation of the Wilderness Act’s dis-
claimer clause concerning water rights.45 The Idaho court also rejected re-
served rights for both the Sawtooth National Recreation Area (NRA) and the 
Deer Flat National Wildlife Refuge, again reversing the SRBA court.46 In the 
former, after the SRBA court awarded rights for the NRA, the state supreme 
court, on a 4-1 vote, construed the relevant statutory disclaimer clause to 
deny reserved rights.47 In addition, the court interpreted the purpose of the 
NRA to not require reserved water to fulfill the reservation’s primary pur-
poses, even though the statute expressly included recreation and preserva-
tion and protection of the area’s fish and wildlife, including salmon.48 The 
court reasoned that, despite this express language, the overarching purpose 
of the Sawtooth NRA was to preserve the land from mining and residential 
development, a purpose that apparently required no water.49 Thus, the court 
narrowly construed the purpose of the reserve, despite express language con-
cerning protecting fish that was remarkably similar to the language in Devils 
                                                       
 44. The Idaho court seemed to suggest that the federal government waited longer in 
the SRBA wilderness case to file suit than it did in Cappaert.  Potlatch II, 12 P.3d at 1267, 134 
Idaho at 923. But that simply wasn’t true. See Reversing Winters, supra note 17, at 192. The 
court also ignored Cappaert’s declaration that federal reserved water rights were not depend-
ent on “competing equities.” Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138–39. Thus, the court felt free to empha-
size statements in the legislative history of the 1964 Wilderness Act that the court thought 
reflected accommodations with economic concerns in that statute. See Reversing Winters, su-
pra note 17, at 193. 
 45. The court interpreted the Wilderness Act’s confusing disclaimer provision—stat-
ing that the establishment of a wilderness was not an “express or implied claim or denial” of a 
reserved right to neither establish nor preclude the establishment of a reserved right if one is 
otherwise expressly reserved. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(6) (2012); Potlatch II, 12 P.3d at 1266, 134 
Idaho at 922. But, according to the court’s majority, that interpretation meant that the dis-
claimer overturned the Supreme Court’s implied reserved rights doctrine, as decided by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in both Arizona and in Cappaert, without saying so. Id. A more persuasive 
interpretation of the disclaimer was that Congress aimed to preserve the status quo, including 
the judicially created doctrine of implied reserved rights. This is the interpretation of the In-
terior Solicitor, 86 Interior Dec. 553, 609–10 (1979), discussed in BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR. 
ET AL, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1055 n.18 (5th ed. 2012). 
Because the disclaimer says that Congress is expressly not denying the existence of reserved 
rights, that statement would seem to be a sufficient refutation of the Fereday/Meyer thesis 
concerning congressional intent. 
 46.. Sawtooth, 12 P.3d 1284, 134 Idaho 940 (2000); Deer Flat, 23 P.3d 117, 135 Idaho 
655 (2001). 
 47. Sawtooth, 12 P.3d at 1286, 134 Idaho at 942 (construing 16 U.S.C. § 460aa-8(a) 
(2012)). 
 48. Id. at 1288–89, 134 Idaho at 942–43 (interpreting 16 U.S.C. §§  460aa(a), -1(a), -
(1)(b), -2, -3(a) (2012)). 
 49. Id. at 1290, 134 Idaho at 943 (although “we agree fish require water, we do not 
agree judicial notice of this fact establishes that without such water the purposes of the non-
wilderness portion of the Sawtooth NRA will be entirely defeated.”); see also id. at 1290–91, 
134 Idaho at 943–44 (“the Act was [only] intended to protect fish and wildlife habitat caused 
by mining operations within the wilderness area”). 
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Hole Monument that the U.S. Supreme Court in Cappaert v. United States 
concluded reserved federal water rights.50 
In the latter case, the Idaho court decided that the Deer Flat National 
Wildlife Refuge, consisting of nearly a hundred islands in over a hundred 
miles of the Snake River for the purpose of establishing “a refuge and breed-
ing ground for migratory birds and other wildlife,” did not require reserved 
water because the purpose of the refuge was merely to protect the birds from 
hunters, not from water depletions that could connect the islands to adjacent 
lands, exposing the birds to predators.51 The court also decided that the exec-
utive order establishing the refuge contained no standard for quantifying the 
amount of reserved water, quoting from the Cappaert decision52 and repeat-
ing its earlier declaration in the wilderness water case.53 
The Idaho Supreme Court did uphold reserved water rights in the case 
of the Hells Canyon NRA and several wild and scenic rivers because their 
governing statutes contained language that the court interpreted to expressly 
reserve water.54 What happened in the aftermath of those decisions is instruc-
tive; both cases were settled in a manner to threaten no existing diversions 
and to allow some limited future ones.55 In short, there’s virtually no one who 
can claim any injury from the assertion of reserved rights in Idaho. 
                                                       
 50. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text; infra note 52 and accompanying 
text. 
 51. Deer Flat, 23 P.3d at 126–67, 135 Idaho at 664–65 (2001) (“Even if it were shown 
that the purpose of the island reservations has evolved over the years to . . . foster isolation 
from predators, those purposes were not present at the time of the reservations.”). 
 52. Id. at 125, 135 Idaho at 663 (“Unlike Cappaert where specific quantification could 
be determined to preserve the endangered fish . . . there is no standard for the amount of water 
necessary to have an island.”). In Cappaert, the Court’s statement about congressional intent 
needs context, as the case involved an express reservation of water, not an implied reservation, 
so naturally the Court’ would be concerned about congressional intent. See Cappaert v. United 
States, 426 U.S. 128, 139–41 (1976) (noting that the 1952 Proclamation establishing Devil’s 
Hole expressly mentioned both the preservation of the pool and the pupfish that resided there). 
However, in reserved rights cases involving implied intent the Court has looked to the purpose 
of the reservation, and whether that purpose required water. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 
373 U.S. 546, 599–600 (1963) (intent inferred from the purposes of a national recreation area, 
a national wildlife refuge, and a national forest); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 
707 n.14 (1978) (water reserved only for purposes of timber supply and watershed protection, 
not for fish and wildlife), The “standard of quantification” the Idaho court called for but could 
not find lies in the purposes of the statute or executive order reserving the lands. See supra 
note 42 and accompanying text. 
 53. See supra note 45. 
 54. Potlatch II, 12 P.3d 1260, 1268–69, 134 Idaho 916, 924–25 (2000) (interpreting 
16 U.S.C. § 460gg(b), which includes “waters” within the NRA, and 460gg-3(a) and (b), which 
disclaimed any affect upstream of the reservation and any flow requirements on the Snake 
River below the reservation); Potlatch I, No. 24546, 1999 WL 778325 (Oct. 1, 1999) (un-
published opinion) (concluding that it would be “anomalous” to conclude that the Wild and 
Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C § 1271 et seq.), a statute “expressly created to preserve free-flowing 
rivers failed to provide for the reservation of water in the rivers”). 
 55. The SRBA court decreed multiple federal reserved water rights within the Hells 
Canyon NRA, including tributaries of, but not the Snake River itself, and for various rivers 
covered by the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, namely segments of the Salmon, Clearwater 
and Rapid Rivers and their tributaries. However, as a result of a settlement, the federal wild 
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You would think that the lawyers of the winners would be satisfied with 
their immense success. Not so, as they now seek to export and grow the idea 
they almost sold to the Idaho Supreme Court: that the critical determinant 
in the existence of federal reserved water is whether the land reservation was 
established before or after 1955. 
III. 
In a nutshell, the Fereday/Meyer thesis is this: whatever the reserved 
rights doctrine meant in the Supreme Court decisions of 1955 and 1963, those 
decisions concerned pre-1955 land reservations.56 In 1955, they maintain that 
the Pelton Dam decision fundamentally changed reserved water rights law. 
57 That is an unusual interpretation of Pelton Dam, previously reviled by wa-
ter diverters as a decision undermining the security of their water rights. 
Fereday and Meyer, on behalf of their water-diverter clients, now claim that 
the decision was a landmark heralding the end of the doctrine they long op-
posed. Their revolutionary interpretation of reserved rights law would virtu-
ally end the capability of the doctrine to retain water on federal lands for non-
consumptive uses, like fish and wildlife protection and recreational uses. 
The Fereday/Meyer interpretation of the disappearance of implied re-
served rights succeeded in convincing the Chief Justice of the Idaho Supreme 
Court, to switch her vote on rehearing, providing the crucial third vote to deny 
wilderness water.58 Justice Linda Copple Trout wrote that congressional 
                                                       
rivers water rights were made subordinate to existing upstream diversions, and a permit pro-
cess was created by which the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) may allocate 
diversionary water rights in the future, up to certain stipulated limits. See Stipulation and 
Joint Motion for Order Approving Stipulation and Entry of Partial Decrees, In re SRBA, Sub-
case No. 75-13316 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Aug. 20, 2004), https://www.idwr.idaho.gov/WaterManage-
ment/WaterRights/Wild_Scenic/PDFs/Wild&Sce-
nic_STIPULATION_AND_JOINT_MOTION_FOR_ORDER_APPROVING_STIPULATION_
AND_ENTRY_OF_PARTIAL_DECREES.pdf; Order Approving Stipulation and Entry of Ba-
sin 78 Partial Decrees, In re SRBA, Subcase No. 79-13597 (Idaho Dist. Ct. May 2, 2005), 
http://srba.idaho.gov/Images/2013-12/7913597xx00567.pdf. Fereday and Meyer state that 
there is likely to be “only limited opportunity for conflict” between future Idaho water users 
and the federal government in the Hells Canyon NRA. Fereday & Meyer, supra note 10, at 
366.  
 56. Fereday & Meyer, supra note 10, at 343–44. 
 57. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Oregon (Pelton Dam), 349 U.S. 435 (1955) (holding that 
under the Federal Power Act, the Federal Power Commission has exclusive authority to grant 
licenses for hydroelectric projects on federally reserved land, and that the Desert Land Act of 
1877, which suggested that Oregon could regulate the use of these waters instead, did not 
apply). 
 58. Potlatch II, 12 P.3d at 1270, 134 Idaho at 926 (Trout, C.J., concurring). This 
switch was perhaps prompted by Chief Justice Trout’s concern over her impending reelection, 
given the full-throated political campaign against Justice Silak the initial wilderness water 
rights opinion engendered. Justice Trout was successfully reelected in 2002, but she resigned 
before serving out the full term because she objected to increasingly partisan nature of Idaho 
judicial elections. See DIALOGUE, http://idahoptv.org/webstream/dialogue/13/d1334.mp3 (June 
14, 2007) (discussing the reason for her resignation and her support for changing judicial elec-
tions to reduce their partisan nature). 
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awareness of the implied reserved rights doctrine, at least after the Supreme 
Court’s 1963 decision in Arizona v. California, ended the doctrine: “Where, as 
in this case Congress has chosen for whatever reason not to create an express 
water right despite its knowledge of a potential conflict, I believe it can no 
longer be inferred that such a right is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the 
reservation.”59 A separate concurrence by Justice Wayne Kidwell also em-
braced the Fereday/Meyer interpretation, writing: “application of the federal 
reserved water rights doctrine is not appropriate where Congress has ex-
pressly discussed, then refused to reserve, water rights.”60 But these two con-
currences did not make a majority,61 and therefore Fereday and Meyer’s arti-
cle aims to revive their argument, although they see the source of the doctri-
nal change in the 1955 Pelton Dam decision, not the 1963 Colorado River 
decision.62 
Pelton Dam is an unlikely source of their revolution in reserved rights 
law, as the decision has long been considered the harbinger of Arizona v. Cal-
ifornia, which upheld reserved water for national forests, wildlife refuges, 
and national recreation areas.63 This decision produced considerable Western 
alarm—as it expanded the scope of the federal reserved water rights doctrine 
beyond Indian reservations.64 But actually, according to Fereday/Meyer a 
half-century later, the case led to the termination of the century-old federal 
reserved water rights doctrine. Even more startling, this termination oc-
curred quite quietly, with no definitive congressional action at all. That’s a 
lot of freight for any legal theory, so it requires some unpacking. 
The Fereday/Meyer thesis begins with the proposition that reserved 
rights are a function of congressional intent.65 Certainly Congress can—and 
has—both declared and disclaimed its intent to establish reserved rights, as 
the Executive Branch.66 From this unremarkable observation Fereday and 
Meyer wade into murkier waters, arguing that by hinting that reserved rights 
applied to non-Indian federal reservations,67 the U.S. Supreme Court funda-
mentally transformed federal reserved rights law. Their idea is that although 
                                                       
 59. Potlatch II, 12 P.3d at 1271, 134 Idaho at 927 (disagreeing with the majority, 
which ruled that the Wilderness Act’s disclaimer provision, supra note 45, simply preserved 
the status quo; in her view, the provision reversed the status quo). See Reversing Winters, 
supra note 17, at 196–97. 
 60. Potlatch II, 12 P.3d at 1272, 134 Idaho at 928 (Kidwell, J., concurring). 
 61. The majority opinion is explained supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text. 
 62. Fereday & Meyer, supra note 10, at 346. 
 63. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564–65 (1963). 
 64. See B. Abbott Goldberg, Interposition–Wild West Water Style, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(1964); Todd A. Fisher, The Winters of Our Discontent: Federal Reserved Water Rights in the 
Western States, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1077 (1984); Janice L. Weis, Federal Reserved Water 
Rights in Wilderness Areas: A Progress Report on a Western Water Fight, 15 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 125 (1987). 
 65. Fereday & Meyer, supra note 10, at 343. As mentioned above, supra note 45, the 
search for congressional intent, if not express, centers on the purposes of the reservation: if 
water is necessary to achieving those purposes, there is a federally reserved water right. 
 66. See infra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
 67. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Oregon (Pelton Dam), 349 U.S. 435, 444 (1955). 
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Congress could—and did—establish reserved water rights before 1955 by re-
serving lands for particular purposes which required water, after the Pelton 
Dam decision politicized the issue and engendered congressional debate 
about reserved water rights, Congress lost the ability to create federal water 
rights by reserving lands for purposes that required water.68 Post-1955, their 
argument goes, Congress had to expressly reserve federal water rights. 
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has ever recognized the alleg-
edly transformative effect of the Pelton Dam decision. Congress continued to 
establish reserved lands for purposes requiring water,69 and the Court 
handed down decisions in 1976 and 1978 affirming the implied nature of fed-
eral reserved water rights.70 Fereday and Meyer are undaunted by these 
cases, since they involved federal land reservations established before 1955.71 
Fereday and Meyer repeatedly argue that the reserved rights doctrine 
is not an “immutable rule of law,” but a matter of congressional intent.72 If 
there is such a thing as an “immutable” rule of law, it is clearly not the im-
plied reserved water rights doctrine, which Congress has acted to alter on 
numerous occasions.73 When it does do so, however, their claim is that Con-
gress can no longer rely on the Supreme Court-sanctioned doctrine because 
implied federal water rights for reserves established after 1955 disappeared. 
How this happened is the basic problem with their thesis, as explained below. 
IV. 
To make the Fereday/Meyer thesis operative, one has to believe that 
dicta in a Supreme Court opinion can change legal doctrine accepted for over 
a half-century.74 And effectuate dramatic change: instead of being able to rely 
on Supreme Court rulings concerning how public land statutes setting aside 
reserved lands created implied water rights, according to Fereday/Meyer, 
Congress was suddenly disabled from relying on what was the clear state of 
reserved rights law. 
                                                       
 68. Fereday & Meyer, supra note 10, at 351–52. 
 69. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANICLA), 16 U.S.C. § 3101 
(2007). 
 70. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); United States v. New Mexico, 
438 U.S. 696 (1978). 
 71. Devils Hole National Monument, at issue in Cappaert, was established by an ex-
ecutive order of President Truman in 1952. 426 U.S. at 131. Gila National Forest was estab-
lished by multiple separate presidential proclamations in 1899, 1905, 1907, 1908 and 1910. 
Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (N.M. 1977) aff’d sub nom. United 
States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978). 
 72. See, e.g., Fereday & Meyer, supra note 10, at 343, 345, 347, 351, 355, 365, 367. 
 73. See infra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
 74. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Oregon (Pelton Dam), 349 U.S. 435, 444–48 (1955). 
The Pelton Dam opinion suggested that the reserved rights doctrine of Winters might apply to 
federal reservations, but was actually decided based on the authority of the federal govern-
ment under the Federal Power Act to preempt any regulatory powers that Oregon acquired 
through the Desert Land Act of 1877.   
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Fereday and Meyer acknowledge that the Wilderness Act’s disclaimer’s 
language75 could be interpreted, as the U.S. Justice Department always has, 
as a disavowal of intent to affect reserved rights already in existence or those 
that would be created in the future.76 They cite legislative history indicating 
that Congress meant in the disclaimer to adopt the Justice Department’s in-
terpretation.77 Ironically, this interpretation should have been enough to jus-
tify the initial Idaho Supreme Court decision affirming the existence of wil-
derness water rights, since Congress aimed in the Wilderness Act to ratify 
the existing law of implied federal water rights. 
Although Fereday and Meyer concede that reservations established be-
fore 1955 have implied reserved water rights,78 their theory denies such 
rights for land reservations created after 1955 (post-Pelton Dam decision). 
Their position is that “where Congress debated the reserved water rights 
question for a land designation and then declines to establish an associated 
water right by express language, there can be no implication that Congress 
intended to create the right. In fact, without an express reservation, the op-
posite implication arises.”79 They cite no authority for this dramatic change 
in reserved rights law. 
Apart from Wilderness Act legislative history and statutory language 
that undermines their position,80 the Fereday/Meyer argument makes no ef-
fort to explain why Congress would think that debating an issue without tak-
ing action would change the law. Even without the disclaimer’s apparent at-
tempt to maintain the existing law, a conscientious legislator, with 
knowledge of reserved rights law, would reasonably interpret congressional 
inaction to ratify the status quo, not radically overturn it.81 In short, mere 
debate over the wisdom of reserving water rights for particular federal lands 
reflects insufficient congressional intent to change settled legal doctrine es-
tablished by the Supreme Court. The Fereday/Meyer thesis fundamentally 
misunderstands the nature of the legislative process. Since there are many 
                                                       
 75. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 76. Fereday & Meyer, supra note 10, at 351. 
 77. Id. at 351 n.52. 
 78. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57. It is not clear how their theory about 
the significance of 1955 accounts for their interpretation of the 1964 Wilderness Act’s dis-
claimer, which claimed not to deny the existence of reserved water rights. 
 79. Fereday & Meyer, supra note 10, at 350 (discussing 104 CONG. REC. 6344 (1958)). 
 80. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. 
 81. See, e.g., RICHARD E. LEVY & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, STATUTORY ANALYSIS AND 
THE REGULATORY STATE 215–20 (Foundation Press 2014), discussing, inter alia, Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989) (“considerations of stare decisis have spe-
cial force in the area of statutory interpretation, for . . . Congress remains free to alter what 
we have done.”); see also United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, 132 S.Ct. 1836, 1841 
(2012); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008); see also Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drugs Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733, 749 (1975) (“The longstanding ac-
ceptance by the courts, coupled with Congress’ failure to reject Birnbaum’s reasonable inter-
pretation of the wording of § 10(b), wording which is directed toward injury suffered ‘in con-
nection with the purchase or sale’ of securities, argues significantly in favor of acceptance of 
the Birnbaum rule by this Court…We are dealing with a private cause of action which has 
been judicially found to exist, and which will have to be judicially delimited one way or another 
unless and until Congress addresses the question.”). 
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reasons for legislators to favor silence on a particular issue, inferring a con-
gressional position from silence is hazardous.82 
Justice Scalia has long counseled against using legislative history as a 
surrogate for the words that Congress actually used.83 For example, in his 
concurring opinion in Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District 
v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, a 2010 case involving the application of the False 
Claims Act to state officials, he warned against using “stray snippets” of leg-
islative history to divine congressional intent, since members only vote on the 
text of a bill.84 In another case, he discounted legislative history as a kind of 
“ventriloquism” in which “[t]he Congressional Record or committee reports 
are used to make words appear to come from Congress’s mouth which were 
spoken or written by others (individual Members of Congress, congressional 
aides, or even enterprising lobbyists).”85 Justice Scalia’s textualism tri-
umphed in the Court’s recent affirmation of the application of federal subsi-
dies in the Affordable Care Act to federally-operated insurance exchanges, as 
Chief Justice Roberts opinion relied on the text, not the legislative history of 
the statute.86 It seems safe to suggest that Justice Scalia’s admonitions 
against the use of legislative history apply fully to the Fereday/Meyer theory 
of congressional inaction changing the underlying law of implied federal re-
served water rights. 
Congress is fully capable of indicating when it does not wish a federal 
reserve to have waters rights and has done so many times.  For example, the 
                                                       
 82. See Lawrence H. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds 
of Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515, 515–17 (1982); Levy & Glicks-
man, supra note 81. 
 83. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Liess, Comment, Censoring Legislative History: Justice 
Scalia on the Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation, 72 NEB. L. REV. 568 (1993). 
 84. 559 U.S. 280, 302 (2010): 
 
I agree that the stray snippets of legislative history respondent, the 
Solicitor General, and the dissent have collected prove nothing at all 
about Congress’s purpose in enacting [the statute]. But I do not share 
the Court’s premise that if a ‘legislative purpose’ were ‘evident’ from 
such history it would make any difference. The Constitution gives le-
gal effect to the ‘Laws’ Congress enacts [] not the objectives its Mem-
bers aimed to achieve in voting for them. If [the statute’s] text in-
cludes state and local administrative reports and audits, as the Court 
correctly concludes it does, then it is utterly irrelevant whether the 
Members of Congress intended otherwise. Anyway, it is utterly im-
possible to discern what the Members of Congress intended except to 
the extent that intent is manifested in the only remnant of ‘history’ 
that bears the unanimous endorsement of the majority in each House: 
the text of the enrolled bill that became law. 
 
 85. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 73 (2004).  
 86. King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480 (2015). See Jon Healy, Justice Scalia’s method 
triumphs in Obamacare case, if not his views, L.A. TIMES (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-scalia-obamacare-legislative-history-
20150626-story.html. 
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1993 Colorado Wilderness Act rejected reserving water rights,87 as did the 
1988 congressional reservation of Idaho’s Hagerman Fossil Beds National 
Monument.88 The president also knows how to disclaim reserved rights, as 
President Clinton did in the 1996 Grand Staircase-Escalante National Mon-
ument.89 The problem that Fereday/Meyer have is not with congressional or 
presidential authority; it’s their clients’ inability to get Congress or the pres-
ident to exercise it. That political difficulty is no reason for the courts should 
radically change federal reserved rights law. 
Fereday and Meyer also attempt to distinguish other examples of con-
gressional acquiescence to Supreme Court rules similar to the implied re-
served water rights rule by suggesting that the examples of the judicially cre-
ated antitrust exemption for major league baseball and judicial deference to 
federal preemption despite a states’ rights saving clause in federal hydroelec-
tric licensingare are distinguishable. 90 These decisions are different, accord-
ing to Fereday and Meyer, because those cases involved reauthorization of 
the same statute, something that does generally occur in the case of reserved 
lands. However, the same reserved water issue reoccurs in all virtually new 
federal land reservations, as evidenced by the fact that Fereday and Meyer 
claim that the issue is so familiar to Congress that there will never be another 
federal reserve without express language claiming or renouncing the creation 
of federal water rights.91 
Finally, Fereday and Meyer emphasize that the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated that neither Senator Frank Church (in the case of Idaho wilderness 
areas) nor President Franklin Roosevelt (in the case of the Deer Flat National 
Wildlife Refuge) would have intended to hinder economic development by 
claiming reserved water rights.92 Neither the court nor the authors provided 
any specifics as to this alleged intent to curb reserved water rights; the court 
merely made vague allegations, which the authors’ repeat. Without specifics, 
one is left to conclude that it served the interests of both the Idaho Supreme 
                                                       
 87. Colorado Wilderness Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–77, 107 Stat. 756 § (8)(b)(2)(B) 
(1993) (“Nothing in this Act shall be construed as a creation, recognition, disclaimer, relin-
quishment, or reduction of any water rights of the United States in the State of Colorado ex-
isting before the date of enactment of this Act . . . .”). 
 88. An Act to Provide for the designation and conservation of certain lands in the 
states of Arizona and Idaho, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 100-696, 102 Stat. 4571 § 304 
(1988) (“Nothing in this title, nor any action taken pursuant thereto, shall constitute either an 
expressed or implied reservation of water or water right for any purpose”). 
 89. Establishment of the Grand Staircase-Enscalante National Monument, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 50,223, 50,225 (Sept. 18, 1996) (“This proclamation does not reserve water as a matter of 
Federal law”). 
 90. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 273 (1972); California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 497 
(1990). 
 91. Fereday & Meyer, supra note 10, at 351 (“As a practical matter, all new federal 
land designations will deal with the question whether federal water rights are intended.,” and 
citing nine federal reserves in which Congress expressly reserved or denied federal water 
rights). 
 92. See Fereday & Meyer, supra note 10, at 354–55, 367 (citing Potlatch II, 12 P.3d 
1260, 1268, 134 Idaho 916, 924 (2000)); Deer Flat, 23 P.3d 117, 128–29, 135 Idaho 655, 666–
67 (2001).  
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Court and the authors to invoke iconic political figures to support their posi-
tion in the absence of specific intention by either Church or FDR. 
CONCLUSION 
The weaknesses in the Fereday/Meyer theory should not mask its poten-
tial to revolutionize federal reserved water rights. Because of the McCarran 
Amendment,93 their argument is likely to be heard by extremely receptive 
judges who face reelection in states dominated by the political power of water 
diverters. Given the fractured federalism of reserved water rights created by 
the McCarran Amendment, it is possible that the most hostile anti-federal 
arguments that succeed in state courts (or threaten to succeed, as in the case 
of the Idaho Supreme Court’s wilderness water decision) could proliferate 
across a West long filled with anti-federal sentiment, especially among ex-
tractive industries.94 
If the Fereday/Meyer argument prevails in other state courts, post-1955 
reservations in which water is clearly necessary to fulfill their purposes would 
have no water rights. For example, the Black Canyon of the Gunnison, ex-
panded to include wilderness in 1999, would presumably have no water.95 
                                                       
 93. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2012) (authorizing state court jurisdiction over so-called com-
prehensive water rights adjudications); see 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 
37.04(a) (discussing the McCarran Amendment and its continuing effect on western water 
law).  
 94. See RICHARD WHITE, IT’S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN: A HISTORY 
OF THE AMERICAN WEST 576 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) (describing the New Right’s 
revival of old resentments against the federal government in the 1960s), 604 (describing the 
New Right’s “sweeping indictment of the federal government,” epitomized by the political rise 
of Ronald Reagan). On the dangers of having “extractive elites” like the Idaho water diversion 
lobby dominate government; see DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATION’S 
FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (Crown Business, 2012), discussed 
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ues: Is This the Question?, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 273, 278 (2014). 
Some sense of the continuing political antipathy extractive industries have generated 
toward the federal government in the arid West can be gleaned from the effort of the state of 
Utah to demand that the federal government gift it specified federal lands in the state; see 
Utah Transfer of Public Lands Act, U.C.A. 1953 §§ 63L-6-101-1905 (2012). Although garnering 
some political support—at least in Utah—the transfer demand has no legal basis. See Robert 
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L. 1 (2014). 
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Neither would the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness, created by the 
1964 Wilderness Act.96 Numerous other federal lands would lack water 
rights, including over fifty reserves established in the 1960s by the Kennedy 
and Johnson Administrations under the leadership of Secretary of the Inte-
rior Stewart Udall.97 
Fereday and Meyer’s effort to extend their success in the SRBA litiga-
tion West-wide, could, if successful, substantially damage federal public land 
resources in the service of their diversionary clients. That’s not a prescription 
that augers well for a Western environment that figures to be under severe 
stress due to the effects of climate change during the remainder of the 21st 
century.98 
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